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Guerrilla Radio: Has the Time Come
for a Full Performance Right in
Sound Recordings?
ABSTRACT

Musicians and songwriters occupy a unique place in society as
purveyors of composition and expression that impart an intangible
benefit to society. Understanding the value of "Science and useful
Arts," the Foundersprovided Constitutionalprotection for individuals
spending time, money, and energy pursuing creative endeavors. Music
defines generationsand pivotal moments in history, and has rightfully
taken its place at the forefront of human expression. When music
began reaching the masses in the early twentieth century, both record
labels and radio, even in its infancy, helped propel artists to the
national spotlight. Johnny Cash, Ray Charles, and Pearl Jam all owe
their success to the efforts and collaborations of radio and label
executives-and of course their own talents. The relationship between
artists, labels, and radio has not always been symbiotic, especially on
the issue of compensation, and the advent of the Internet has helped
matters little. The fight over profit allocationbetween these key players
in the music industry is once again on display. The re-introductionin
Congress of the Performance Rights Act raises issues about the
appropriate extent of protection for a "performance right" to copyright
owners of sound recordings. Artists and labels want radio to
compensate them for their talents and time; radio says traditional
broadcasting does not threaten record sales and serves as free
advertising. Though numerous pushes against broadcastersfor this
performance right have failed, it is a recurring issue unlikely to
disappearin the future.
This Note examines the history of copyright protectionfor sound
recordings and other musical works in the United States. It begins by
examining the statutory development of copyright protection for
musical compositions and sound recordings, and the nature of those
compensation schemes. The Note then introduces the Performance
Rights Act, and analyzes the potential reasonsfor and effects of the Act
on radio, record labels, and artists, as well as the changing scope of
copyright protection in both traditional, terrestrial radio and digital
549

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 12:3:549

transmissions. Finally, this Note suggests Congress should pass the
Performance Rights Act, but should consider ways to minimize
negative financial implications for radio, and align the bill with the
goals of American copyright law.
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Aspiring artists spend years, even decades, pursuing an artistic
craft. Many artists dedicate their lives to perfecting songwriting and
singing, or developing technical expertise on a musical instrumentinvesting in talent now in the hope of a future payoff. The way artists
receive that payoff, if any, varies. Some artists are able to generate
consistent income through album sales, touring, or merchandising,
while others find steady careers as songwriters, studio musicians, or
get hired to tour with more prominent acts.' The media providing
access to music was once limited to terrestrial radio on Amplitude
Modulation (AM) or Frequency Modulation (FM) signals and
1.
David J. Hahn, Average Income of a Musician, http://www.musicianwages.cona/
musician-profile/average-income-of-a-musician (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (discussing the
different ways musicians should diversify their performance outlets in order to sustain income).
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From the 1930s until the introduction of
phonograph records.
television in the 1950s, radio was the dominant medium, bringing
music to millions of listeners. 2 Today, however, the landscape looks
quite different. Technological developments allowed people to listen to
music through numerous outlets, including records, cassette tapes,
and compact discs (CDs); and new technology provides access to music
from webcasters like Pandora, from online music stores like iTunes,
via peer-to-peer file-sharing, over satellite radio, on music television
3
channels like MTV, and on websites like YouTube and MySpace. The
Napster controversy over unauthorized downloading indisputably
showed record labels and artists that if consumers did not have to
4
As new technologies
purchase music, they were not going to.
unfettered access to
with
continue to provide a hungry audience
music, often at no cost, lawmakers should strive to protect the rights
of copyright holders of both musical compositions and sound
recordings from infringement of their rights, honor the full scope of
the performance right, and promote fair compensation schemes.
Legislation should protect artists dependent on the revenue generated
from public enjoyment of their creative works while encouraging the
development of new media to provide those works to the public.
Today, the average artist has neither a consistent nor
particularly lucrative stream of income, despite representing nearly
5
two million people in the United States workforce. The presence of
artist unions6 and musician hospitals, such as The New Orleans
Musician's Clinic, 7 indicates that the average performing musician
8
does not live the charmed life of Faith Hill and Tim McGraw. Nearly

Nadia Lerner, Radio's Golden Years: Expert's Take on Radio in its Heyday - 1930s to
2.
1950s, SUITE101, Jan. 5, 2004, http://radioindustry.suitel01.com/article.cfmlradios-golden-years
(last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
Pandora, http://www.pandora.com/#/stations/create/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010);
3.
(last visited Mar. 8, 2010); YouTube,
iTunes, http://www.apple.comlitunes/download/
http://www.youtube.coml (last visited Mar. 8, 2010); MySpace, http://www.myspace.coml (last
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see
4.
also Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One-Investiture
of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863 (2008).
See Press Release, Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, National Endowment for the Arts
5.
Announces New Artists in the Workforce Study (June 12, 2008), available at
(analyzing the demographic and
http://www.nea.gov/news/newsO8artistsinworkforce.html
employment patterns of artists based on statistics from the United States Census Bureau).
See, e.g., Nashville Musicians Association, http://www.afm257.org/ (last visited Feb.
6.
15, 2010) (protecting performers and songwriters through collective efforts).
The New Orleans Musicians Clinic, http://www.neworleansmusiciansclinic.org/ (last
7.
visited Feb. 15, 2010).
Hahn, supranote 1.
8.
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half of all musicians are freelance and work only part-time. 9
Moreover, the income of the average working musician is around
$34,000 a year. 10 The concept of the struggling musician or artist hits
close to home for many in the music industry, and is sometimes seen
as a badge of honor by artists who refuse to sacrifice their craft for
more lucrative or commercial opportunities that conflict with their
creative vision." I To the public, however, the exception might seem
like the rule. Indeed, many rising artists likely continue to pursue
their dreams based partially on what they perceive to be the reachable
success of artists like Cher, The Rolling Stones, Diana Krall, Alison
Krauss, and Jay-Z. Although not superstars, average musicians do
get paid-the subject of constant debate and controversy, though, is
how. Copyright law can help to resolve some of that conflict.1 2
As it has developed, the purpose of American copyright law is
to foster knowledge, creativity, and education in order to benefit the
author in the short term and the public in the long term. 13 This goal
is largely achieved by encouraging the development of new media of
expression by granting authors a limited monopoly in certain
exclusive rights related to uses of their works.1 4 With the advent of
commercial radio, musicians and songwriters gained national
exposure for their compositions, and the public gained access to new
music, eventually in recorded form.1 5 Record labels and radio stations
thereafter collaborated to make money in this new industry: radio
through advertising, record labels through the production, sale, and
distribution of sound recordings.1 6 However, federal copyright law did
not protect sound recordings until 1971, even though protection for

9.

Press Release, Nat'l Endowment for the Arts, supranote 5.

10.

Id.

11.
CBS News Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast Mar. 26, 2009).
12.
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, General Licensing
Report Forms, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/about.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (describing
the royalty payments available for publishing copyright holders); Broadcast Music, Inc., About,
http://www.bmi.com/about/?link=navbar (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (describing the royalty
payments available under licensing agreements for songwriters, composers, and publishers);
SESAC, Inc., About Us, http://www.sesac.com/About/About.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2010)
(describing the organization as a performance rights organization dedicated to procuring royalty
payments to songwriters and publishers for the performance of their works).
13.
JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 19 (2d ed.
2006); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
14.
Id. at 22-24.
15.
See generally Jim Cox, AMERICAN RADIO NETWORKS: A HISTORY (MacFarland & Co.
2009).
16.
Letter from David K. Rehr, President and CEO, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, to The
Honorable Nancy Pelosi, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/020409_DKRPTaxHouse.pdf.
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musical compositions was granted in the early 1800s.1 7 Still, even in
the early development of the music industry, artists protested against
the use of their performances in sound recordings without express
permission or compensation.18 However, because federal copyright
protection did not extend to sound recordings, artists had to rely on
uncertain and inconsistent state common law remedies that provided
little redress for unauthorized uses of their work. 19 Although sound
recordings currently receive limited copyright protection, 20 radio
stations still do not pay artists for airplay of their performances,
though record labels and radio stations continue to generate large
profits from their use. 21 Although more successful artists may receive
compensation from record sales, live performances, and merchandise,
those who do not or who long ago ceased to receive such revenue are
deprived of an important source of compensation for use of their
22
performances in sound recordings.
Modern technological advances shed new light on whether
copyright law should protect sounds recordings. In the early 1970s,

COHEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 24 (noting 1831 as the year musical compositions
17.
were afforded copyright protection); Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 140, 85 Stat. 39 (1971)
(prior to 1976 amendment). There are two separate copyrights in every sound recording: one in
the underlying musical composition, and one in the sound recording itself. See generally Tim
Brooks, Copyright and Historical Sound Recordings: Recent Efforts to Change U.S. Law, 65
NOTES: Q.J OF THE Music LIBR. ASS'N 464, (Mar. 2009) (describing the evolution of the copyright
protection in sound recordings). The songwriter and publisher usually hold the copyright in the
underlying musical composition, while artists and record labels hold the copyright in the sound
recording that embodies that musical composition. Id. The distinction is nuanced, but crucial,
and the two copyrights are treated differently under the law. Id. Currently, the authors of
musical compositions are paid a royalty for any public performance of their work, while the
performer on a sound recording is preventing from receiving that same royalty for radio airplay
of their performance of the song. Id.
See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940) (indicating performers
18.
historically opposed unauthorized uses of previous recorded performances on the radio).
Brooks, supra note 17, at 465 (indicating that state law remedies in one state
19.
regarding sound recordings could have unintended, negative consequences for the use of that
sound recording in other states). Even now, sound recordings created before 1972 are not
protected by federal copyright law, and owners must still seek redress for unauthorized use
under state law. Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006) (granting a performance right for the digital
20.
transmission of sound recordings).
Alan L. Montgomery & Wendy W. Moe, Should Record Companies Pay for Radio
21.
Airplay? Investigating the Relationship Between Album Sales and Radio Airplay, (Carnegie
Mellon University Working Paper, 2000), available at http://repository.cmu.edultepper/332/
(analyzing the relationship between radio airplay and album sales, noting in particular the
profitability of current practices for both record labels and radio broadcasters).
Christopher Knab, Artist Income Sources, MusIc BIZ ACADEMY, Jan. 2008,
22.
(listing various sources of
http://www.musicbizacademy.com/knab/articles/artistincome.htm
revenue for musicians).
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sound recordings became copyrightable under federal law. 23 However,
this protection was more limited in scope than for musical
compositions, as it purposefully excluded a performance right. 24
Additionally, the Internet enabled the easier transfer and distribution
of sound recordings through digital transmissions and made copyright
infringement problems more acute and widespread. 25 The concern
among entertainment industry players was that a main source of
revenue for labels and artists, record sales, was becoming
substantially diminished by availability of songs free-of-charge on the
Internet. 26 Record labels and artists were eventually successful in
pushing Congress to protect sound recordings from unlawful
reproduction, distribution, and unauthorized performance-but the
rights were still strictly limited to digital transmissions. 27 The scope
of protection for copyright holders against digital audio transmissions
is still contested, and new lawsuits arise every year seeking to define
which uses are protected. 28 Despite this vigorous debate, artists
remain uncompensated for public performances of their work via AM
or FM radio. The proposed Performance Rights Act (PRA) seeks to
resolve this issue by including terrestrial radio transmissions in the
performance right guaranteed by copyright law to their counterpart in
digital transmissions and musical compositions. 29
This Note examines the development of copyright law with
regard to musical compositions and sounds recordings, why
performance royalties are paid for some uses and not others, how the
PRA seeks to remedy a perceived loophole for artist compensation, and
the motivation behind the legislation. To do so, the Note addresses
the current conflict between the purpose of terrestrial broadcast
23.
See Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 140, 85 Stat. 39 (1971); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7)
(2006) (amending federal copyright law in 1971 to include "sound recordings," as now defined in
17 U.S.C. § 101 as "works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other
sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in
which they are embodied").

24.

Id.

25.
See Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009)
(describing the unlawful reproduction and distribution problems associated with digital audio
transmissions over the Internet).

26.

Id.

27.
17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
28.
See Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3rd Cir. 2003) (seeking to
determine whether streaming music from a radio broadcast onto that broadcasters website was
included in the terrestrial radio exemption for sound recording royalties); see also Arista Records,
LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir. 2009) (determining whether "webcasting"
services are "interactive" within the meaning of the Copyright Act).
29.
Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. (2009).
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performance royalties and the opposing viewpoints, and then analyzes
whether the goals served by including a performance right in digital
sound recordings are also served by a performance right in terrestrial
Part I examines the development of copyright
transmissions.
compositions and sound recordings, and the
musical
protection for
reasons protection in sound recordings may not have been
immediately necessary to encourage creativity. Part II describes the
PRA and the basis for its introduction in Congress, and compares its
purpose and effect with those of the Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recording Act. Part III analyzes the potential effects such
royalty payments may have on traditional radio, record labels, artists,
and the music industry generally. Finally, Part IV presents the Note's
conclusion that Congress should pass the PRA, but seek to minimize
adverse financial effects and negative externalities that may run
counter to the goals of copyright law.
I. BACKGROUND: COPYRIGHT LAW AND SOUND RECORDINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES

Copyright law protects a broad scope of creative and artistic
expression. 30 In the United States, the purpose of copyright law tends
to reflect the valuation of economic incentives and productivity over
the moral rights or integrity of artists. 31 However, some statutory
provisions and case law support the idea that moral rights of authors
are also recognized and respected, though perhaps more implicitly,
within the existing protections of copyright law. 32 Copyright law
grants artists a temporary monopoly-ownership of exclusive methods
of control over their works for a specified length of time-and courts
have consistently stated that the purpose underlying the Copyright
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (granting copyright protection to literary works,
30.
musical works, dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictoral, graphic, and
sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and
architectural works).
COHEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 6 (framing the purpose of copyright protection as an
31.
answer to the "public goods problem in intangibles") ("Once the good is produced, there is no way
to exclude others from enjoying its benefits," diminishing the author's incentive to create.).
Granting authors certain exclusive rights in the use of their intellectual property is seen as a
utilitarian answer to encourage the production of creative works and provide the public with
access to those works. Id.
See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding ABC "impaired
32.
the integrity" of the works of Monty Python by airing edited versions of the television series
without permission); see also Visual Artist Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (granting certain
rights of attribution, and the right to prevent distortion, mutilation, or modification of a work
that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation to certain visual works in a defined
category).
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Clause in the Constitution is to "encourage the production and
dissemination of artistic works for the general public good." 33
Protecting the use of sound recordings did not seem to address the
stated purposes of copyright law,34 and as a result, recordings were
denied protection until the 1970s. 35
However, as technological
changes increasingly deprived creators of the economic benefits of
their works, Congress began paying attention. 36 Although sound
recordings and the creative minds behind those recordings now receive
some protection, the scope of that protection is incomplete.
A. Copyright Generally
The Copyright and Patent Clause is found in Article I, Section
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution. 37 The Clause states: "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 38
Due to the open-ended
constitutional language, the scope of copyright protection has been
challenged, altered, and amended since its inception, and continues to
expand and adapt to attempt by lawmakers to harmonize economic
39
and artistic goals, and to benefit society.
Congress formally embraced the idea that copyright protection
offered an educational purpose in the Copyright Act of 1790.40 The
stated purpose of the Act was the "encouragement of learning," and
the Act granted authors the "sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing, and vending" copies of various works for a
33.
Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Ladd v. Law &
Tech. Press, 762 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing the overarching goal of copyright as that of
serving the public good).
34.
The National Association of Broadcasters, No Performance Tax: Oppose the Record
Label-Led Performance Fee on Radio, http://www.noperformancetax.org (last visited Oct. 15,
2009) (indicating digital audio transmissions create a perfect digital copy that can be captured by
the end user, creating a market replacement, and that those concerns are not implicated with
transmission of sound recordings over terrestrial radio).
35.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2006).
36.
See Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 2009) ("At
the time, the United States Register of Copyrights referred to the [I]nternet as 'the world's
biggest copying machine.' " (quoting Stephen Summer, Music on the Internet: Can the Present
Laws and Treaties Protect Music Copyright in Cyberspace?, 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 31, 32
(1999))).
37.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
38.
Id.
39.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 24-26 (describing the extension of copyright
protection from 1790 until the late twentieth century).
40.
Id. at 22.
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period of fourteen years, with one option to renew for another fourteen
years. 41 Through the Act, Congress sought to incentivize authors to
share their works with the public by securing them a way to protect
their creative efforts. 42 However, this early Act limited protection to
"authors of maps, charts, and books," 43 and did not include other types
of writings or works like musical compositions, newspapers, or the
works of foreign authors. As new technologies emerged, however,
Congress continued to expand copyright protection to other works as
44
they became adversely affected by changing markets and technology.
Musical compositions were accorded statutory copyright
protection in 1831, 45 and received additional protection under the
Copyright Act of 1909.46
The 1909 Act extended the period of
copyright protection granted to works to a maximum of fifty-six years,
instead of the previous twenty-eight. 47 In addition, the 1909 Act
added a public performance right to musical compositions, 48 and
protection to all the original works of the author when those works (1)
were published and (2) notice of copyright was attached. 49 More
importantly for musical compositions, the Act created the first
compulsory mechanical license, allowing anyone to make a
phonorecord of a musical composition without the consent of the
copyright owner as long as the user complied with the requirements of
the license and paid the statutory fee. 50 This license was originally
intended to cover the use of piano rolls on player pianos, but now
51
applies to covers of songs as well.
A year before the 1909 Act was enacted, the Supreme Court
held that a player piano roll was not a copy of the musical composition
that it represents because it was created for a machine to read, and
therefore was not a reproduction within the meaning of copyright
41.
Copyright Act of 1790, available at www.copyright.govfhistory/1790act.pdf (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010).
42.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 24 (indicating that by the end of the nineteenth
century, copyright protection was an established means of encouraging knowledge and learning).

43.

Id. at 24.

44.
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332; 28
U.S.C. § 4001 (1998) (creating heightened penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet).
45.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 24.
46.
Copyright Act of 1909, available at www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010).
47.
Id. at 27. The original fourteen-year limit on copyright protection was renewable
once, making the maximum time of copyright protection twenty-eight years. Id. at 22.

48.

Id. at 27.

49.
Copyright Act of 1909, available at www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf (last
visited Mar. 9, 2010)..
50.
COHEN ET AL., supranote 13, at 447; see 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
51.
COHEN ET AL., supranote 13, at 447.
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law. 52 As a result, the owner of the copyright in a musical work could
not obtain payment for such a use. 53
Although the Court
acknowledged the negative implications of the holding for composers,
it declined to further address them, leaving the question for legislative
resolution.5 4 The compulsory license made it possible to record and
distribute a cover version of a hit song once a recording was released,
as long as notice was given to the copyright holder of intent to use and
the user paid the set statutory fee. 55 The copyright holder cannot
prohibit reproductions of this kind, and is forced to accept a
predetermined statutory fee for these uses.
With the advent of commercial radio broadcasting and mass
production of sound recordings of musical compositions, new
unauthorized uses of works revealed gaps in copyright protection. For
example, Paul Whiteman, an orchestra conductor and composer in the
1930s, attached a label to each record produced stating that it was
"Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast" in an attempt to prevent the
unauthorized performance of his works on the radio." 56 The radio
broadcasters disregarded this notice, and in 1937 Whiteman filed
what became a landmark case against the W.B.O. Broadcasting
Corporation, seeking an injunction to prevent the station from
broadcasting the performances without his permission. 57 RCA joined
the lawsuit against W.B.O., but also requested a judgment against
Whiteman stating that he had no interest in the recordings of his
performances due to superseding provisions of his existing recording
contract.5 8 The question was simple: could W.B.O., as the purchaser of
Whiteman's recorded performances, broadcast them to the public
without compensating either RCA or Whiteman?
The district court said that W.B.O. could not, holding that
Whiteman's common-law property rights in the works passed to RCA
under his contract, and the record company could enforce those rights

52.
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 14 (1908).
53.
Id. at 18.
54.
Id.
55.
COHEN ET AL., supranote 13, at 447.
56.
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1940).
57.
Id.
58.
Id. Whiteman's dispute was with broadcasters and his record label. Disagreements
and legal disputes over record label contracts have existed as long as the industry, a fact
terrestrial radio executives points to as a bigger reason for the lack of financial stability of
performers. National Association of Broadcasters, Oral Testimony of Steve Newberry and Larry
PatrickBefore House Judiciary Committee, http:/www.nab.org/documents/newsrooml
pressRelease.asp?id=1753 (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).

PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN SOUND RECORDINGS

2010]

In addition, the court found that
against the radio station.59
Whiteman was entitled to an injunction against W.B.O. because
broadcasting Whiteman's performance without his consent constituted
unfair competition. 60 Whiteman appealed the ruling that his commonlaw property rights in the work passed to RCA by virtue of his
recording contract, and RCA appealed the court's determination of
61
Whiteman's rights.
In a decision that would shape radio broadcasting for the next
seventy years, Judge Learned Hand and the Second Circuit reversed
62
the ruling of the district court and found for W.B.O. Broadcasting.
Hand defined copyright protection as consisting of the right to prevent
others from reproducing a protected work, and held that W.B.O. had
not violated this right. 63 Instead, the station merely purchased the
recordings and put them to their intended use-playing them on
record players. 64 To Hand, this action did not constitute copying the
65
work, which would require the permission of the author or publisher.
In fact, the court announced that Whiteman himself had allowed the
copying of his performances when he recorded with RCA, and he could
not subsequently blame the public for unlawful copying simply
because they put that copy to its intended use. 66 In conformity with
the common-law property interest at issue, Hand stated that once
chattels are sold, any restrictions upon their use are presumptively
invalid. 67 The radio station lawfully purchased a copy of Whiteman's
performance in the sound recording. 68 Once the copy was purchased,
neither Whiteman nor RCA had control over its subsequent use by the
purchaser. 69 The decision helped put radio on solid legal ground to

59.
RCA Mfg., 114 F.2d at 87; Judge Hand's opinion treats rights in musical works
under a real property framework. However, copyright cases and protections have begun to adopt
a tort-centered analysis in dealing with injury and compensation for infringement claims, see e.g.
Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (analyzing the tort of contributory infringement).
Broadcasting was competition with the live performances that composers relied on
60.
for income. RCA Mfg., 114 F.2d at 87

61.

Id. at 88.

62.
See id. at 90 (addressing both Whiteman's claims against broadcasters and the
record label's claims against Whiteman).

63.
64.

Id. at 88.
Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. at 89.

67.
Id. The reasoning in Whiteman is in conformity with the first sale doctrine, which
permits the owner of physical property in which intellectual property is contained to alienate
that property in any manner the owner chooses, as long as he or she does not infringe the
copyright protections in the underlying work. See COHEN ET AL., supranote 13, at 369.
Whiteman, 114 F.2d at 87.
68.

69.

Id.
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play records without compensating performers for the next seventy
years.
B. Copyright in Sound Recordings
The lack of copyright protection in sound recordings forced
record labels to come to a different financial arrangement with radio
broadcasters in order to generate income, which largely worked until
new technology permitted seemingly unfettered duplication of sound
recordings and presented music in a wider variety of formats. Radio,
even if not directly paying for music, was essentially advertising new
music to listeners, and the success of this practice bred fierce
competition to get songs on the air.70
With the explosion of
commercial radio in the 1950s increasing scrutiny of the format, it
soon became clear that record label conglomerates were paying
terrestrial broadcasters under the table to play their songs on the
air. 71 "Payola," as it came to be known, became the object of national
controversy in the 1950s and is now an illegal practice under federal
law. 72 With no performance rights for sound recordings and loss of
control over which songs were played, record labels and artists again
relied predominantly on record sales and other revenue streams to
generate profits.
Finally, the Sound Recording Act of 1971 (SRA) extended the
first federal copyright protection to sound recordings. This protection
arrived late into a booming music industry era already thriving on the
relationship between record labels and radio broadcasters. 73 The SRA
gave copyright holders an exclusive right "to reproduce and distribute"
any "tangible" copies of sound recordings. 74 Noticeably absent from
the rights included in the SRA was the performance right accorded
other musical works, despite the existence of recorded sound in the
1800s and the phonograph machine in the early 1900s. 75 As a result,
70.
Ed McKenzie, Gimmie, Gimmie, Gimmie on the Old Payola:A Deejay's Expose - and
Views, LIFE, Nov. 23, 1959, at 45, availableat http://books.google.com/books?id=
X1UEAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA45&dq=payola&pg=PA45#v=onepage&q=payola&f=false
(describing
the rise and fall of pay-for-play during the commercial radio boom in the 1950s)
71.
Id.
72.
Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2006) ("All matter broadcast by any radio station
for which any money, service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or
promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the
time the same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such
person.").
73.
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2009).
74.
Id.
75.

COHEN ET AL., supranote 13, at 444.
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the SRA denied owners of sound recording copyrights, principally
record labels, the right to extract licensing fees from broadcasters of
76
recorded music.
Under current copyright law, copyrighted works other than
sound recordings are fixed in "copies."7 7 However, sound recordings
are fixed in "phonorecords," which are defined as the material objects
from which sounds can be perceived either directly or by using a
machine.78 Copyright protection of recordings (phonorecords) differs
from the protection granted to musical compositions (copies), which
includes a performance right. 79 The oft-cited reason for the lack of a
80
sound recording performance right, and a recurring argument today,
is that the symbiotic relationship between radio stations and record
labels eliminated the need for this right in order to protect against
economic loss.81 Although largely a post hoc rationalization, radio
broadcasters and record labels do enjoy a seemingly symbiotic
economic relationship. Nevertheless, artists and labels continue to
push for a performance right in sound recordings,8 2 and after the
passage of the SRA, Congress studied the need for stronger copyright
83
protection in this area for the next twenty years.
Currently, copyright protection extends to two elements in
recorded music: (1) the musical composition, including the words and
music, and (2) any recording of that composition.8 4 The copyright in
musical compositions provides the owner with the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform, and alter the work.8 5 These rights
entitle the copyright holder to receive royalties when they choose to

76.

Id.

77.

Lydia Pallas Loren, Understandingthe Complexity of Music Copyrights in the United

States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE

DIGITAL AGE 161, 166 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).

78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80.
Free Radio Alliance, Media Center, http://www.freeradioalliance.org
mediaCenter.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
81.
Id.
82.
Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 766 (E.D.P.A. 2001) (noting the
recording industry first requested a broad performance right in the 1920s and has continued to
do so until this day).
83.
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In
response to continued lobbying by the recording industry, Congress and the Copyright Office (the
"Office") studied the need for stronger copyright protection for sound recordings for two decades
after passage of the SRA.")
84.
Posting of Howie Cockrill (Copyright: Performance Rights Act Pt. 1) to M.E.L.O.N.,
http://beatblog.typepad.com/melon/2008/02/copyright-amfm.html (Feb. 2, 2008, 11:01 EST).
85.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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license those exclusive rights to others.8 6
Performing rights
organizations such as the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers (ASCAP), SESAC, and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
87
collect and distribute performance royalties to copyright holders.
These royalties come from terrestrial, Internet, and satellite radio, as
well as cable and other digital outlets.88 In contrast to performance
rights for compositions, sound recording copyright holders receive
called
rights
organization
a
performance
via
royalties,
SoundExchange, that collects from all of these sources except
traditional AM or FM radio.8 9 Specifically, 17 U.S.C. §106(6) states
that copyright holders have exclusive right "in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of
digital audio transmission" only.90
C. PerformanceRights in DigitalAudio Transmissions of Sound
Recordings
Until 1995, neither labels nor artists had any performance
right in sound recordings. Between 1971 and 1995, a technological
boom in entertainment media formats created new dangers of
unauthorized use of copyrighted works, and the concept of music
piracy on the Internet made national headlines. 91 In light of these
changes, Congress reevaluated whether copyright protection should
include a performance right for sound recordings.
As music became widely available on the Internet, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) viewed on-demand
92
radio as a potential market replacement for album sales.
Essentially, if users could listen to music broadcasts online, or

86.
Cockrill, supra note 84.
87.
The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, supra note 12
(describing the royalty payments available for publishing copyright holders); Broadcast Music,
Inc., supra note 12 (describing the royalty payments available under licensing agreements for
songwriters, composers, and publishers); SESAC, supra note 12 (describing royalty payments for
copyright holders for public performances).
88.
The
American
Society
of
Composers,
Authors
and
Publishers,
http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/whocollect.html (listing the entities from which ASCAP
collects performance royalties).
89.
See SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2009);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006) (listing four specific objectives in the calculation of royalty
rates).
90.
17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2009).
91.
Lev Grossman, Learing to Love Your Inner Pirate, TIME, June 4, 2007, at 54,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1625209,00.html; see also Jube
Shiver, Jr., Digital Double Trouble, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1994, at Al.
92.
Cockrill, supra note 84.
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download songs from the Internet free of charge, they would no longer
purchase music. 93 The risk of unauthorized copying by transmitting
songs over the Internet was considered more dangerous than
recordings made from terrestrial radio because the digital sound
quality far exceeded analog recording, and it was much more
convenient to create a copy. 94 After some discussion on Capitol Hill,
Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
95
Act.
Congress stated two primary reasons for providing a
performance right for digital audio transmissions. 96 First, to promote
the continued creation of new sound recordings and musical works;
inadequate protection in a digital environment risked discouraging
creation. 97 Second, the interactive nature of Internet radio increased
potential adverse effects on the sale of sound recordings and limited
the enforcement of existing copyright protection. 98 As a result, the
performance right was limited only to digital transmissions of sound
recordings in order to simultaneously encourage the development of
new media and forms of distribution.9 9 The National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB) probably also played a role in limiting the
performance right to only digital transmissions. 10 0
Three years later, Congress again evaluated the implications of
developing technology with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
expanding the performance right to include interactive webcasters. 10 1
What constitutes "interactive" under the Act remains an open
question, but it clearly does not include AM/FM broadcasters. It is
clear, however, that under both these laws terrestrial radio remains
exempt from paying a performance royalty to copyright holders of
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2009). It
93.
should be noted that iTunes, which as of April, 2008 was the largest online music store in the
United Status, did not open until 2003. Press Release, Apple, Inc., iTunes Store Top Music
Retailer in the US (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/
03itunes.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).

94.

Id.

musicFIRST, Background, http://musicfirstcoalition.org/background1 (last visited
95.
Feb. 16, 2010).
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, at 154 (2nd Cir. 2009).
96.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1506
100.
Before the Subcomm. On Courts and IntellectualProperty Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1
available at
of Copyrights)
Peters, Register
of Marybeth
(1995)
(statement
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat062895.html (noting the NAB's continued objection to an
extention of a performance right in sound recordings) (last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
101.

17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006).
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sound recordings for airplay. The enactment of the PRA would change
this by establishing a full performance right in sound recordings for
the first time in American copyright history.
II. THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS ACT
A. Amendments and Provisions Grantinga PerformanceRight for
TerrestrialRadio Uses
In February of 2009, Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy,
along with Representatives Darrell Issa and John Conyers, introduced
the PRA in Congress. 10 2 The stated purpose of the PRA is to provide
"parity in radio performance rights," and "fair compensation to artists
for use of their sound recordings."' 10 3
Fairness to artists and
performers is the dominant theme echoing from supporters of the
Act.104 Section 2 of the PRA is entitled "Equitable Treatment for
Terrestrial Broadcasts," and seeks to amend the exclusive
performance right granted in § 106(6) of the Copyright Act to read: "in
the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of an audio transmission," replacing the current "digital
transmission" and bringing terrestrial radio uses within the control of
copyright holders.10 5 The PRA also strikes the word "digital" from §
114(d)(1) and § 114(j)(6) of Title 17, which would also bring terrestrial
radio within the existing statutory licensing structure.1 0 6
Seemingly aware of disparities in financial capability between
larger corporate and smaller local radio stations, the PRA also
includes a special treatment provision for noncommercial, educational,
and religious radio stations, as well as certain incidental uses of sound
recordings.10 7 Instead of charging set royalty payments across the
board, the PRA states that any "individual terrestrial broadcast
station that has gross revenues in any calendar year of less than
$1,250,000" may elect to pay an annual flat fee of $500 to $5,000reduced to $1,000 for public broadcast entities-in lieu of the
individual royalties the station would otherwise be required to pay on
a per-play basis.10 8 The PRA is not specific about the mathematical
102.
103.
104.
2010).
105.
106.
107.
108.

Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
Id.
musicFIRST, Mission, http://musicfirstcoalition.org/mission/ (last visited Feb. 16,
Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2(b)-(c).
Id. § 3.
Id. § 3(a)(1)(D)-(E).
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method for calculating royalty payments, and it remains unclear
whether the exception for smaller stations would be meaningful in
application. Instead, if a traditional radio station does not qualify for
or elect to pay the flat fee, the royalty amount due will be determined
through either independent negotiation or by the Copyright Royalty
Board. 10 9 Currently, § 801(b) provides general factors the Board
should consider in making royalty determinations. 110 However, the
only economic guidance provided is to "minimize any disruptive
impact on the structure of the industries involved."1"' Without specific
economic guidance, corporate radio giants remain uncertain, and
understandably wary, as to how the PRA will affect their bottom
112
line.
In addition, the PRA includes provisions protecting incidental
uses of sound recordings and the existing rights of copyright holders of
musical works, stating that the new provisions shall not be used to
adversely affect royalty payments or publishing rights already
established under the Copyright Act.1 1 3 In essence, this provision
effectively prevents radio broadcasters from siphoning off royalty
payments from musical composition copyright holders in order to pay
the new performance royalties.
The NAB has successfully blocked the grant of a performance
right in sound recordings for decades. 11 4 Before the enactment of the
1976 Copyright Act, Congress considered including a full performance
right for sound recordings along with a compulsory licensing system
modeled after that for mechanical reproductions of works.11 5 This
broad protection was not included in the final version of the bill,
mostly as a result of strenuous opposition from broadcasters,
performance rights organizations, and publishing companies.1 16 Not
surprisingly, broadcasters opposed paying new royalties for activities
they freely engaged in for decades, and around which they built their
business model.1 1 7 Similarly, performance rights organizations and
Posting of David Oxenford (Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Radio
109.
Performance Royalty and Platform Parity for Webcaster Royalties) to Broadcast Law Blog,
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2009/08/articlesfbroadcast-performance-ryalty/senatejudiciary-committee-hearing-on-radio-performance-royalty-and-platform-parity-for-webcasterroyalties/ (Aug. 6, 2009).
17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2006).
110.
Id. § 801(b)(1)(D).
111.
The National Association of Broadcasters, supranote 34.
112.
Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, 111th Cong. § § 5(a)(1)(i)(1) (2009).
113.
Loren, supranote 77.
114.
Id. at 166-67.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
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publishers enjoyed exclusive control over royalty payments for the use
of the underlying musical works and did not want to divide what they
perceived to be the fixed amount of money radio stations were willing
to pay. 118 Subsequently, in 1978, the Copyright Office released a
report endorsing a performance right in sound recordings. 1 9 Despite
this recommendation, broadcasters have successfully thwarted the
inclusion of such a right to this day. 20
There was less momentum from broadcasters to block the
enactment of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
of 1995. Congress addressed the recording industry's fear that digital
delivery of songs would replace the need for CDs and other profitmaking tangibles. 12' Because traditional radio play did not implicate
the same music piracy concerns as its digital counterpart, a
performance right for AM/FM uses was still excluded. 122 However,
there is evidence that the broadcasting lobby, among others, had a
hand in keeping Congress from rocking the boat and upsetting the
"longstanding business and contractual relationships" between
powerful players in the music industry. 123 Indeed, Congress admitted
as much. 124 Nevertheless, broadcaster opposition eventually gave way
to the political compromise that resulted in the Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act.125
B. ComparativeRights
The absence of a performance right in sound recordings in
American copyright law is almost unique in the world. 126 Upon
introduction of the bill to Congress, Representative Issa stated that
America's ignorance of intellectual property rights was a worldwide
embarrassment, and that the legislation presented the opportunity to
118.

Id.

119.
Steven M. Marks, Entering the Sound Recording Performance Right Labyrinth:
Defining Interactive Services and the Broadcast Exemption, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309, 311
(2000).
120.
Id. at 311 n.12 (stating that the lack of a performance right in the U.S. is a "huge
loss" to copyright holders).
121.
Loren, supra note 77, at 168.
122.
Id.; see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, 1201-1205, 13011332; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2004).
123.
Loren, supra note 77, at 168.

124.

Id.

125.
Marks, supranote 119, at 311.
126.
Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 38 (2009) (statement of Paul Almeida, President, Department for Professional
Employees, AFL-CIO), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers1lllth/111.
8_47922.PDF.
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correct that ignorance. 127 Although the United States is a signatory to
the Berne Convention, which affords broader, global protection for
copyright, America is not a signatory to the 1961 Rome Convention for
the International Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms,
and Broadcasting Organizations, which128requires all members grant a
performance right in sound recordings.
Along with the United States, there are less than a handful of
countries that do not recognize a sound recording performance right:
China, Iran, Rwanda, and North Korea. 129 As a result of this missing
right, performers in the United States are deprived of substantial
revenue streams that foreign governments and commercial entities
would otherwise be obligated to pay for AVFM broadcasts of
American songs; the nearly one billion dollars ASCAP collects
annually for music publishers and songwriters indicates that similar
However, granting a
revenue may exist for performers.130
performance right is not a guarantee to this foreign revenue, as Article
to opt out of the
16 of the Rome Convention allows signatories
131
royalties.
performance
foreign
pay
to
obligation

III. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING A PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN
SOUND RECORDINGS

Aside from the benefit of harmonizing United States copyright
law with that of other countries, there are several arguments offered
in support of the adoption of a performance right in sound recordings.
Supporters make the equitable arguments that such a right is a basic
songwriter counterparts are
fairness to performers whose
compensated for the same use of their work and that such a right
would further incentivize the creation of sound recordings, enhancing
132
Opponents of a
the economic goals of American copyright.
would bankrupt
right
a
such
granting
that
state
right
performance
Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Hatch Introduce Bipartisan
127.
Performance Rights Legislation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://Ileahy.senate.gov/press/200902/
020409a.html.

128.

Emily F. Evitt, Money, That's What I Want: The Long and Winding Road to a Public

PerformanceRight in Sound Recordings, 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 11 (2009).

129.

Hearingon H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,supra note 126, at 38.

ASCAP, Music & Money, Performing Right Payments, www.ascap.org/musicbiz/
130.
money-payments.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
131.
Broadcasting Organisations arts. 12, 16, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.

132.

Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a

General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 473, 475
(2004); Evitt, supra note 128, at 11.
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terrestrial radio stations, impede public access to important public
services, and limit public access to sound recordings. 133 In addition,
because radio stations already provide free publicity to performers,
opponents believe the right is unnecessary to incentivize creativity. 134
A. The Merits of a General PerformanceRight
1. Fairness
Performers and record labels view the creation of a finished
musical product as a collaborative effort of creative interdependence
and decry the fact that only part of the contributors receive
compensation for the performance of a copyrighted work.135
Songwriters and publishers who create musical compositions are
compensated through a performance right, whereas the artists and
record labels that collaborate to bring that music to life and provide
the financial means to produce it are not. 136
The contribution of the performer is as important as-if not
more important than-that of the musical composer or songwriter. In
essence, the performer is the last step in the process of creating a
sound recording of a musical composition, and consumer purchases of
recorded music are influenced more often by the artist performing the
songs than the writer composing them. 137 Arguably, the royalties that
ASCAP and BMI pay to songwriters are determined by and dependent
upon the success of the particular artist performing the work. 138 It is
rather obvious that, when a major artist like Whitney Houston or
Carrie Underwood performs a song, the potential publishing revenue
for the songwriter increases dramatically. 139

133.
The National Association of Broadcasters, supra note 34.
134.
DelNero, supra note 132, at 493; see also David Lieberman, Fight Looms over Music
Royalties, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2009, at 2B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/
2009-10- 2 0-radio-music-royalties-congressN.htm.
135.
Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Applauds
Introduction of New Performance Rights Legislation (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.riaa.com/
newsitem.php?id=7BE7264B-5BC4-C823-777D-73D5B410805A (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
136.
DelNero, supra note 132, at 501; Press Release, Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists, AFTRA Members Applaud Senate Judiciary Approval of Performance Rights Act (Oct.
15, 2009), available at http://www.aftra.org/D2E63093CE1747CDB100A362F7EE16E8.htm.
137.
DelNero, supra note 132, at 501-02 (suspecting that consumers are unlikely to know
the names of hit songwriters such as Bruce Robinson and Farrah Braniff, but are intimately
familiar with the Dixie Chicks, which "took those composers' work to the top of the Billboard
charts").

138.

Id.

139.
For example, Elvis Presley approached Dolly Parton earlier in her career as a
songwriter, seeking to record her song, "I Will Always Love You." Although Elvis would have
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Furthermore, preventing performers from reaping the benefits
of their performances defies traditional principles of equity and
fairness. In addition to the performers, the contributions of producers
that create the sound and direction of a song and of record labels that
bear the financial risk of producing sound recordings are also
overlooked. 140 In fact, the record producer "is akin to a music
of all public performance
publisher, who typically receives 14half
1
royalties for a musical composition."
The flip side of this equity argument points out radio's
promotional value in generating income for artists from album,
merchandise, and ticket sales that songwriters do not earn unless they
Even supporters of a performance right
are also the artist.
acknowledge the promotional value of radio airplay and the
substantial revenue generated from this medium. 142 Indeed, the
promotional value of radio is evident in the payola scandal in the
1950s. 143 Recently, Warner Music Group CEO Edgar Bronfman stated
that radio airplay was a "critical driver of music sales" and cited
artists such as Madonna, Jay-Z, and Paramore as current
beneficiaries of radio airplay.144 Similarly, former NAB Executive Vice
President Dennis Wharton stated, "Purely and simply, free radio
airplay is the primary driver of music sales in America, and local radio
stations build a foundation of fans who buy music, attend concerts,
and pay $60 for T-shirts."'14 5 Essentially, broadcasters agree that
performers should be compensated for use of their work but argue that
performers are already compensated through radio's promotional
46
force.'
The question remains whether the relationship between radio
and record labels and a performance right in sound recordings are
brought the song national attention, Parton refused because Elvis also demanded ownership of
the publishing rights. Many years later, Whitney Houston recorded the song without demanding
publishing rights and earned Parton six million in royalties from her performance. Liz Hoggard,
Dolly Parton: Liz Hoggard Meets the Country Legend, OBSERVER, Apr. 20, 2008, at 30, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2008/apr/20/popandrockl7 (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
Steven J. D'Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 29
140.
UCLAL. REV. 168, 175-76 (1981).
DelNero, supra note 132, at 502.
141.
Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, Warner Music CEO Touts Radio's
142.
Promotional Value (Aug. 7, 2009), availableat http://www.nab.org/documents/newsrooml
pressRelease.asp?id=2070.
Brooks Boliek, Radio Giant Faults Labels: Clear Channel CEO Deflects Pay-for-Play
143.
Blame, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 31, 2003 (stating that payola became a household word when a
popular disc jockey was exposed for taking bribes to play records on the radio).
Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, supra note 142.
144.

145.

Id.

146.

DelNero, supranote 132, at 506-07.
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relevant to one another.
The seemingly symbiotic relationship
between the record industry and radio business models is not
necessarily related to, or a substitute for, revenue that would be
generated from granting a performance right and therefore seems to
be a post hoc argument by broadcasters for maintaining the status
quo. Moreover, the promotional argument becomes less compelling
when viewed through the lens of artists that are no longer active in
the entertainment industry, who are not the featured artist on a song,
or who are not generating revenue through ticket sales and other
income related to radio airplay. Radio airplay is unlikely to foster
record sales for songs played on oldies or classical stations across the
country, yet radio operators still profit from use of those works. 147 The
argument is weakened, logically, when radio's promotional benefits to
the artist are diminished or non-existent. Additionally, terrestrial
radio is no longer the dominant outlet for access to musical works, as
it competes with satellite radio, cable, and various digital formats that
promote music and pay a performance royalty. 148
Furthermore, a balanced analysis cannot overlook the fact that
broadcasters profit substantially from the use of sound recordings,
generating millions of dollars annually in advertising sales.1 49 The
primary motivation for broadcasters to play music is not for its
promotional value to record labels, artists, and songwriters, but
simply to generate income through advertising. 150
Radio play
arguably provides the same promotional value to songwriters and
composers, who receive additional compensation through performance
rights royalties. 51 The promotional argument is increasingly difficult
to justify to artists and performers who are not played on popular
stations because they do not receive the same benefits from radio
airplay of their performances.
In addition, broadcasters claim that the primary reason
performers are largely overworked and underpaid is due to their
ongoing exploitation by record labels, not due to the lack of a
147.
Id. at 510.
148.
See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998); Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 1506 Before the Subcomm.
On Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 1 (1995)
149.
Clear Channel Reports Year-End and www.clearchannel.com/Investors/
Documents/318.pdf
150.
DelNero, supra note 132, at 510.
151.
The National Association of Broadcasters, supra note 34 (arguing that publishing
royalties differ from performance royalties, as songwriters and composers do not carry the same
name recognition that allows performers to financially exploit themselves to make money, a
reasoning that largely applies only to performers with enough success to capitalize on any selfexploitation opportunities).
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performance right. 152 Record labels undoubtedly maintain superior
bargaining power over artists seeking to bring their music careers to a
larger audience, and contractual arrangements between the two
entities overwhelmingly favor record labels. 153 Prominent artists,
such as Eminem and the Allman Brothers, have frequently sued their
15 4
record labels over unpaid royalties and breach of contract disputes,
and the reason the artist Prince changed his name to an
unpronounceable symbol in the 1990s was to protest his contract with
1 55
Warner Bros. Music.
Record labels provide funding and greater exposure to
otherwise unknown artists, who are generally bound to biased terms
the label sets, and labels are rarely forced to renegotiate these
156 Artists
contracts unless the artist gains enough earning-power.
generally sign away all their potential authorship rights in the work
to the label in exchange for a royalty payment granted to the artist
only if the record company recoups the money invested in the
performer. 157 However, it is questionable whether the disparate
bargaining power between artists and labels is even related to the
issue of performance royalties from AM/FM radio. Broadcasters'
paternal argument that artists would be adequately compensated if
the law provided them equal bargaining power in contract
negotiations sidesteps the issue of what rights with which artists
should have to negotiate.1 58 Whether or not artists choose to sign
away their authorship rights to record labels is unrelated to the rights
to which artists are entitled. A performance right would allow for
potentially more revenue than under current law, and if artists chose
to sign away the potential for performance royalties as well, they
The contractual relationship between
should be so entitled.

152.
Performance Rights Act: Hearingon H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 192 (2009) (statement of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, Recording Industry
Association of America) (stating that some artists, such as TLC, are forced to use bankruptcy as
an extreme remedy in order to release themselves from unfair recording contracts), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/ll1th/1 11-8_47922.PDF.
153.
Phillip W. Hall, Jr., Smells Like Slavery: Unconscionability in Recording Industry
Contracts, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 189, 190-91 (2002).
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Id. at 190, 213.
158.
The National Association of Broadcasters, No Performance Tax: Oppose the Record
Label-Led Performance Fee on Radio, http://www.noperformancetax.org (last visited Oct. 15,
2009) (stating that artists are not the beneficiaries of their record contracts, nor would they
benefit from additional performance royalties in large part because of those contracts).
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performers and labels, dysfunctional though it may be, is unrelated to
artist's entitlement to a performance right.
2. Incentives
American copyright law seeks to maintain the appropriate
balance between incentivizing the creation of new works and
providing the public with access to those works. 159 Courts have had a
difficult time determining the scope of copyright protection in sound
recordings, if any, based partially on how much incentivization would
be increased through the grant of increased copyright protection. 160
Fifteen years after Judge Learned Hand held no copyright protection
existed in sound recordings in RCA v. Whiteman, the Second Circuit
overruled that decision in Capitol Records v. Mercury Records and
granted a right to reproduce and distribute prerecorded music.' 6 '
Later, in 1972, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found a constitutionally-based copyright interest in sound
recordings in Shaab v. Kleindienst.162 The court recognized that
incentives for production change based on new and emerging
technologies and reasoned that changes unanticipated by the Framers
could not prevent protection for sound recordings under copyright
law. 163
The simple economic rationalization for a performance right is
that artists and labels will be more likely to create new works if they
are provided the prospect of gaining more revenue. However, it is less
clear in practice that there is a direct correlation between artist
revenue and creativity. Well-established and successful artists will
probably gain little incentive to create from the grant of a performance
right, as they already gain substantial revenue through alternative
means. Indeed, broadcasters have a strong argument that artists are
already incentivized to create based on revenue gained through other
media. 164 However, for artists on the margin who earn little to

159.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005)
(stating that copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-offs between innovation and
creation and serving the public good); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) (stating that although the immediate effect of copyright protection is to grant a
limited monopoly to give authors a fair return on their works, the overarching goal of copyright
law is to serve the public good).

160.
161.
1940).
162.

Id.
221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); see RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.
345 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1972).

163.

Id. at 590.

164.

See DelNero, supranote 132, at 493; see also Lieberman, supra note 134.
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nothing from record sales, a performance right may help to keep them
in an occupation they would otherwise leave because it is too difficult
to maintain a basic quality of life. After all, very few recording artists
"sell enough albums or generate sufficient income from other sources
In fact, one
for a record company to recoup its investment." 165
industry expert found that only two of ten albums are economically
A performance right might
successful for the record labels. 16 6
incentivize labels to invest in artists that might not otherwise
generate enough album sales to allow the recoupment of production
costs and allow for an enduring revenue stream long after the earning
1 67
power of the performer has declined.
Although the incentives-based argument makes intuitive
sense, it is difficult to determine in practice how new performancebased royalties would actually affect the production of creative works.
The argument depends on the assumption that the lack of this
performance right impedes some artists from entering the creative
markets, though this assumption is difficult to prove. There is simply
no way to determine what works would or would not be created if
"artists had more or less money."168 In addition, copyright protections
must balance these economic incentives with the desire to promote the
general public welfare by providing access to information and creative
works. 169
The Copyright Clause makes clear that copyright protection
must serve a public benefit and limits the duration of exclusionary
Extending and broadening
rights to help achieve this goal.170
copyright protection to performances in sound recordings may restrict
public access to works and diminish the overall public welfare.
Broadcasters argue that additional royalty payments may force a
change in format or reduce the airplay of non-profit-making songs,
depriving the public of musical works to which they would otherwise
have unimpeded access. 171 If increased incentives substantially
diminish the public benefit, the argument becomes less meritorious.
John R. Kettle, III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global
165.
Harmonization - and the Need for Congress to Get in Step with a Full Performance Right for
Sound Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 1041, 1050 (2002).

166.

Id.

167.
DelNero, supra note 132, at 506; Kettle, supra note 165, at 1051.
168.
DelNero, supra note 132, at 506.
169.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 13, at 17 (stating that the concept of public welfare is a
slippery one, especially when looked at from a global perspective, and questioning whether
copyright law is actually necessary to protect that welfare).
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In light of these arguments, the most workable principle under
which to operate is the assumption that economic incentives generally
foster creativity. 172 The principle relies on the more workable
assumption that the creation of some works would be a direct result of
the opportunity for performance royalty payments.
The small
minority of artists unlikely to need additional compensation to
incentivize creativity does not defeat the potential increase in creative
works by artists who would substantially benefit from a performance
royalty. In addition, even if royalty payments change what is played
on the radio in some ways, there is not sufficient economic evidence
that these royalty payments would deprive the public of access to
musical works so as to outweigh the need for a performance right.
B. Arguments Opposing a General PerformanceRight
1. Financial Impact on Traditional Radio Broadcasters
Broadcasters' most persuasive argument against an additional
performance right is a financial one: additional performance royalties,
often referred to by broadcasters as a new tax, will burden
broadcasters financially to the point of bankruptcy.173
Steven
Newberry of the Commonwealth Broadcasting Corporation testified
before the House of Representatives that most smaller radio stations
in American are already struggling financially and that the
performance right would have a particularly adverse effect upon these
stations. 174 The over seven hundred million dollars collected by
ASCAP worldwide in the past year for publishing rights is a potential
reflection of the royalty amounts that could be collected and
distributed to performers as well, which would, naturally, be taken out
of the pockets of mainstream radio.1 75
Specifically, Newberry
172.
COHEN ET AL., supranote 13, at 18.
173.
Performance Rights Act: Hearingon H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 150-51 (2009) (statement of Steven Newberry, Commonwealth Broadcasting
Corporation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/I1Ithl 111-8_47922.PDF;
see also Tamara Conniff, Radio Will Stop Playing Music, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tamara-conniff/radio-will-stop-playing.m-b_316152.html (stating
that due to the economy and the impact of technology, radio has lost an estimated 60 percent of
its advertisers as companies have declared bankruptcy or shut down, and noting that both Clear
Channel and Cox Radio have implemented significant layoffs in the past year, and Citadel is
nearing Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
174.
PerformanceRights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary
(statement of Steven Newberry), supra note 126, at 154 (stating that broadcasters nationwide
reported as much as a 20 percent decline in revenue due to the economic recession).
175.
ASCAP, ANNUAL REPORT, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.ascap.comlabout/
annualReport/annual_2008.pdf.
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predicted that broadcasters would be forced to reduce staff members
and search for offsetting revenues that would "affect the time
available for public service announcements for charities and other
worthy causes, coverage of local news and public affairs, and other
valuable programming." 176 The NAB presents radio as an invaluable
asset to communities, stating that stations generate six billion dollars
in public service annually, and provide vital news and community
information to listeners. 177 In essence, broadcasters argue that the
public would lose a valuable source of information were the
performance right to be enacted because it would create a serious
financial burden for radio that would result in the loss of these
services.
Undoubtedly, a new stream of revenue from sound recording
use would cut into the profits of broadcasters, but this is not in itself a
compelling reason to forego the grant of a performance right in sound
recordings. First, smaller stations seemingly subject to the more
acute financial concerns are considered in the PRA itself.17 8 Although
larger commercial stations will pay royalties either negotiated or
determined by the Copyright Royalty Board, smaller and
noncommercial stations can pay flat fees of $500 to $5,000 annually
179
under the PRA.
Secondly, the fact that terrestrial radio has historically used
music to attract advertisers and advance their business model should
not be a reason to pervert the basic assumptions of an economy
predicated on property rights: those who own the property, not those
who use it, should under most circumstances determine how and when
it is used. 80 Finally, the financial health of traditional radio has
in the economy, such as
remained largely unaffected by fluctuations
8
1
1990s.1
late
the
of
downturn
economic
the
The continuation of radio's financial stability is partially a
result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that amended the
Communications Act of 1934 and opened the floodgates for ownership
consolidation.18 2 Clear Channel Communications, Inc., a conglomerate

176.
(statement
177.
178.
179.
180.
(statement

181.

Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary
of Steven Newberry), supra note 126, at 153-54.
National Association of Broadcasters, supranote 34.
Performance Rights Act, H.R. 848, ll1th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
Id.; see also Conniff, supra note 173.
Performance Rights Act: Hearing on H.R. 848 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary
of Mitch Bainwol), supra note 152, at 192.
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in radio broadcasting, owns 1,240 stations and reaches more than a
hundred million listeners, more than one-third of the American
population.18 3 The closest competitor owns less than a quarter of that
number.18 4 In local markets, four firms control 70 percent of the
market share, and consolidation is even greater in the smallest
markets.1 8 5 Deregulation substantially diminished competition in
radio and concentrated large profits in the hands of a few
conglomerates.1 8 6 Although adding an additional cost to music played
on the radio would decrease broadcasting profits, the business model
that has withstood both technological changes and economic
downturns can arguably adapt by absorbing the new royalty payments
and passing on the costs in other ways.
For example, as an unintended consequence of granting a
performance right, broadcasters might choose to treat record labels
and artists like any other advertisers by selling time spots for play on
the radio to advertise new songs.
This is probably not what
performers and record labels have in mind, but radio could certainly
choose to recoup the new royalty payments by treating music as just
another form of advertising. Such a practice would not be difficult to
implement, as they could charge the rates already established for a
thirty- or sixty-second spot featuring a portion of a new song in order
to encourage listeners to buy the corresponding albums.
2. Listener Loss
Performance right opponents also cite a loss of diversity in
formatting as an inevitable effect of a new performance right. Due to
higher costs that cut into profits, smaller and local stations argue they
will be forced to play only songs that have proven lucrative or to
switch to talk-only formats, including news, sports, and religion,
foregoing music to keep from going dark altogether.1 8 7 However, this
argument loses force in light of the negative toll that deregulation has
already had on diversity in programming.1 8 8 The previous argument
supporting common ownership was that it would increase diversity in

183.
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184.

Id.

185.

Id.

186.
See id.
187.
Andrew Seal, Kill the Bill: Performance Rights Act, CURRENT, Sept. 8, 2009,
http://www.thecurrentonline.com/2.14134/seal-kill-the-bill-performance-rights-act-1.1957240.
188.
Jim Rutenberg, Fewer Media Owners, More Media Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002,
at C1, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/O21business/media/O2MEDI.html.
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programming.1 8 9 As Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
Chairman Michael Powell stated when addressing the potentially
adverse effects of deregulation, 'What does the owner get for having
duplicative products? I don't know why you'd want to have two
newspapers that say the same thing."190
This justification has proven largely untrue as format variety
has not proven to diversify musical selections on the radio. Data from
charts from Radio and Records and Billboard's Airplay Monitor
showed that although format variety increased after deregulation, the
term "format variety" created a misperception because formats with
different names have similar playlists and artist overlap. 191 The data
put playlist overlap between distinct formats up to as much as 76
percent.1 92 In light of the already significant overlap in playlists on
traditional radio, the argument that a new performance right will lead
to a substantial loss in programming diversity rings hollow.193
It is unlikely that a new performance royalty will significantly
harm a terrestrial radio business model that is already centered on
profit-generating songs that make it difficult for independent artists to
get radio airplay. 94 Furthermore, it should be noted that the advent
of newer digital media outlets arguably provide independent artists
with a greater ability to get their music heard than traditional radio,
which could lead to greater diversity in formats and programming in
the digital world than the terrestrial one. Notably, the performance
royalties paid to these artists from digital outlets through the
collective management organization SoundExchange have not driven
them to talk-only formats.
Finally, if terrestrial radio chooses to lean on a public service
justification for limiting a performance right, it opens up the
argument that these indispensable public services belong under
government control and regulation, not to private commercial
corporations. 195 If these services are in fact indispensable to the public
189.

Id.

190.

Id.

191.
See Toomey, supra note 182 (indicating that "alternative," "top 40," "rock," and "hot
adult contemporary" are all likely to play songs by the band Creed, despite the difference in
format name).

192.
193.

Id.
Id.

194.
Id. The advent of other media outlets provides independent artists with a greater
ability to get their music heard than terrestrial radio. There is arguably more diversity in digital
radio stations, who also pay a performance right to those artists.
195.
Telephone Interview with Kenneth Sanney, Assistant Professor at Central Michigan
University, Mich. (Oct. 20, 2009) (discussing the problems with relying on a "public service"
argument).
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welfare, it lends support to the notion of implementing government
subsidies or regulation to assist in maintaining those services.
C. Backlash and Industry Response
Although the PRA initially stalled in 2007, the return of the
196
bill has brought with it renewed adverse reaction and controversy.
Numerous established artists have come forth to support the PRA,
including Amy Grant, U2, Sheryl Crow, and Billy Corgan of the
Smashing Pumpkins, who testified before Congress on the issue. 197 In
response, broadcasters around the nation boycotted artists supporting
198
the PRA and ran on-air spots opposing the performance royalty.
The MusicFIRST coalition, an organization created solely to support
the PRA, responded by filing a complaint with the FCC, seeking an
injunction against the advertisements and requesting the FCC to look
into the actions of radio stations boycotting and intimidating
performers and running adverisements advocating only one side of a
political issue. 199 The NAB called the complaint nothing more than a
political stunt to garner support for the performance right, and the
20 0
FCC stayed investigation until further information was presented.
However, the scathing, well-publicized dispute between
MusicFIRST, the RIAA, and the NAB may have instigated a formal
request by Congress in November 2009 for the NAB to negotiate with
the RIAA and MusicFIRST to reach an agreement on appropriate
royalty payments. 20 1 The NAB begrudgingly agreed in a response
letter stating:
NAB is of course willing to talk with members of Congress on this issue and any issue
that could negatively impact the ability of free and local hometown radio stations to

196.
Cortney Harding, Performance Rights Act Introduced, BILLBOARD, Dec. 18, 2007,
available at http://www.billboard.bizlbbbizcontent-display/industry (last visited Mar. 10, 2010);
see also H.R. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007).
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also include the nearly
serve our listeners. We would hope that any discussion would
202
300 members of Congress who oppose the RIAA-backed bill.

As this Note goes to publication, no agreement has currently been
reached, and Congress awaits the results of ongoing negotiations
before sending the bill to the floor of either house of Congress. It
remains to be seen whether the RIAA can push through a sound
recording performance right, or if the NAB will once again flex its
powerful lobbying muscle to block it once again.
IV. CONCLUSION

American copyright law has never included a full performance
right in sound recordings, which indisputably deprives performers of
one potential, and possibly more enduring, stream of revenue. The
absence of this right is becoming increasingly hard to justify given the
greater goals of copyright law and the desire to harmonize American
law with the global treatment of performance rights. Enacting the
PRA is the most efficient way to effectuate these goals and adapt to
ever-changing creative processes and markets.
Now more than ever, the elements of a finished musical
product are a woven tapestry of the creative contributions of
numerous individuals. Historically, it was commonplace for an artist
to compose both the musical composition and lyrics of a song, perform
it himself, and record that performance with a record label, sometimes
as the producer. 20 3 In such a case, a performance right would appear
more redundant in economic terms, as the artist could already find
protection, control over, and remuneration for the work in a bundle of
other copyrights. However, the structure and business models of the
music business have changed significantly over recent decades,
focusing more on hit singles and personalities as much as the actual
songs performed. 20 4 The result is performers who do only that:
perform a piece of music. Although more prominent artists may
receive significant compensation through album, ticket, and
merchandise sales, these revenue streams are usually limited in
duration. Less prominent artists may not have that luxury. Granting
a performance right increases the potential for artists to continue to
receive compensation long after their star power has faded or to boost
their current meager earnings. It defies principles of equity to allow a
202.
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profit-generating industry to make use of an artist's intellectual
property without compensating the artist for that use.
Although the economic repercussions that may affect
terrestrial radio should not be dismissed, there is ample evidence
indicating an additional performance right will not result in the end of
AM/FM radio as we know it, as the NAB ominously predicts. There
are merely five countries in the world that do not include such a right;
this is a testament to the powerful lobbies that have successfully
prevented a performance right from coming to pass in the United
States. In countries that embrace a performance right in sound
recordings, there is also a thriving traditional radio business that has
survived the obligation to compensate artists.
Moreover, the digital broadcasters already paying a
performance royalty in sound recordings present a workable example
that traditional radio can follow of an effective, cost-efficient manner
in which to sustain a preferred format while compensating
performers. However, the compensation scheme based on the revenue
generated by each station should be determined by incorporating the
recommendations of and negotiations between the RIAA and the NAB.
Each entity is in a better position to advance their own interests and
reach a compromise they can then present to Congress than to accept
a vague, congressional determination. Once an equitable solution for
artists, record labels, and radio broadcasters is reached, it should be
incorporated into the PRA and enacted into law-finally realizing
adequate compensation for performers for the first time.
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